This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of cognitivism. Moral realism stands in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.
According to Richard Boyd[1], moral realism means that:
- Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false, etc.);
- The truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.;
- Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge.
Some examples of robust moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton[2], Geoffrey Sayre-McCord[3], Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo[4], Russ Shafer-Landau[5], G.E. Moore[6], Ayn Rand, John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon[7], and Thomas Nagel. Plato and (arguably) Immanuel Kant[8] could also be considered moral realists. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[9]
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Daily Kos
I generally fall in the realist to sometimes even pessimist section. Heck, I was sure the California Supreme Court would rule against same sex marriage ...
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